Illegal Delay and Confessions in State and Federal Courts – A  Civilized Standard by Smith, Otis M. et al.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 1 
Issue 1 May 1950 Article 4 
1950 
Illegal Delay and Confessions in State and Federal Courts – A 
"Civilized Standard" 
Otis M. Smith 
Charles V. Stoelker Jr. 
Jerome I. Walsh 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Otis M. Smith, Charles V. Stoelker Jr. & Jerome I. Walsh, Illegal Delay and Confessions in State and 
Federal Courts – A "Civilized Standard", 1 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1 (1951). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol1/iss1/4 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
COMMENTS
ILLEGAL DELAY AND CONFESSIONS IN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS - A "CIVILIZED STANDARD" 1
The question of admitting into evidence a confession obtained during a
period of detention beyond that permitted by law has produced two op-
posing answers. The answer in any given case has been determined by an
accidental factor, namely, the court of origin. Such confessions have been
rejectedby the federal courts, 2 but have been freely admitted in state
courts.
It is the purpose of this article to analyze cases which consider the
admissibility of confessions obtained without apparent force - physical
or psychological - but which grow out of an illegal detention; to indicate
the opposing concepts on the admissibility of such confessions; and to ex-
amine the desirability of resolving the conflict by the application of "civ-
ilized standards." 4
The Federal Rule
The need for "civilized standards" to govern criminal procedure and
evidence was manifested by the Wickersham Report. 5 Such standards,
however, were not employed until more than ten years after the publica-
tion of the National Commission's Report when Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered his celebrated opinion in the McNabb case. 6
The McNabb case involved an arrest of the McNabb brothers by feder-
al officers for the murder of an Internal Revenue agent engaged in a liq-
uor raid. After their arrest the McNabbs were detained three days with-
out arraignment; 7 and during this period of illegal detention Benjamin
1. "Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in federal courts
implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure
and evidence." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). (emphasis
added).
2. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
3. See cases cited in Appendices B and C.
4. McNabb v. United States, supra, note 1.
5. Reports No. 8 and 11 issued by the National Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement (1931). See also McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in
the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 Tex. L. Rev. 239, 243 (1946).
6. McNabb v. United States, supra, note 1.
7. "(a) APPEARANCE BEFORE THE COMMISSIONER. An officer making an arrest
under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest without
a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the
(Continued on next page)
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McNabb confessed that he had fired "the first shot, but denied that he had
fired the second," 8 which was said to have killed the agent. Two of his
brothers also made incriminating statements. Upon these statements
were based the McNabbs' convictions. 9 Reviewing these convictions
and considering only the illegal delay, the Supreme Court of the United
States reversed them and announced the rule which forbids "inexcusable
detention for the purpose of illegally extracting evidence from an ac-
cused." 10
This deviation from the ordinary norm caused writers to speculate.
Did the Supreme Court mean what it said in the McNabb case? Would
illegal delay, of itself, render a confession inadmissible? The test for the
new rule came in 1944 when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
United States v. Mitchell. 11 The Court, however, did not consider the
Mitchell case a test; it refused to apply the McNabb rule, saying that the
confession did not grow out of the illegal delay.
1 2
After establishing the McNabb rule and delimiting its use in the Mit-
chell case, the Supreme Court was said to have been i esented with a
dilemma when it granted certiorari in the Upshaw case.'' If there were
such a dilemma, the Court took the bull by the horns by reversing Up-
shaw's conviction, affirming the McNabb rule, and distinguishing the Mit-
chell case. Delivering the opinion for the Court, Mr. Justice Black pointed
out that these cases do not involve a constitutional issue. 14 The issue
involved is a breach by federal officers of a Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure, 15 and the reversal stems from the power of the Supreme
Court to govern the rules of evidence in federal courts.
Thus the Federal Rule, avoiding the constitutional issue and deriving
its force solely from a procedural rule, renders inadmissible any con-
fession obtained during a period of illegal detention.
The State Rule
Although almost every state legislature has enacted a statute 16
nearest available commissioner or before any other nearby officer empowered to
commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States." 18
U.S.C. sec. 3060, Rule 5(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
8. McNabb v. United States, supra, at 338.
9. McNabb v. United States, 123 F. 2d 848 (1941).
10. United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 67 (1944).
11. ibid.
12. In the McNabb Case, supra, note 8, there was an arrest, an illegal delay following,
and a confession elicited during the illegal period; while in the Mitchell Case,
supra, note 10, the confession preceded the period of illegal delay. This pre-
cluded the Court's using the McNabb Rule.
13. Upshaw v. United States, supra; See Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United
States Supreme Court, 43 Illinois L. Rev. 442 (1948).
14. Upshaw v. United States, supra, at 414.
15. See note 7 supra.
16. Maryland, New Mexico, and Vermont have no legislation on the point. The other
jurisdictions' statutes vary only as to language. All require the arresting officer
to take the accused before an appropriate officer without unnecessary delay. For
a compilation of these statutes see Appendix A. For interpretations thereof see
cases cited in Appendix B.
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similar in substance to Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, 17 none has employed the "civilized standard" pronounced in
the McNabb case. Since the decision in that case was not based on con-
stitutional grounds, 18 but on a federal procedural rule, the states are
legally correct in rejecting it and declaring it inapplicable to their own
proceedings.
A rejection of the McNabb rule is the departure point of all the state
cases reviewed. 19 Following this perfunctory rejection, the courts
search for a better rule. The successful search usually produces a rule
which permits the admission of a confession that has been obtained from
a person held in violation of state law. The fact that the defendant was
illegally held at.the time of his confession has not yet precluded the state
courts from admitting the confession. 20
In the cases examined 21 there seem to be three theories upon which
the admissibility of these confessions is justified. These theories shall
be referred to as (1) the coercion theory; 22 (2) the causal connection
theory; 23 and (3) the analogy theory, 4 which is the same doctrine
upon which the admission of illegally seized evidence is rationalized. 25
The coercion-theory states look primarily to the conduct of the police
and investigating officers during the illegal detention. If it can be shown
that these officers did, in fact, coerce the confession by physical violence,
by promises of immunity, by battery type interrogation, or by any other
act that would immobilize the will of the confessor, the confession will be
excluded. It is held by the states that adhere to this theory that the volun-
tary or involuntary nature of a confession controls its admissibility.
The causal connection theory is closely related to the coercion-theory
in that its proponents are concerned only with the voluntariness or invol-
untariness of the confession. Illegal detention, however, will be considered
as a factor which could induce the confession and it will be weighed with
the other evidence. Although this consideration is given the illegal delay,
there is no indication of a tendency in states that have been examined to
exclude confessions solely on the grounds that they are the products of an
illegal detention.
The third theory which, for want of a better name, is called the anal-
ogy theory is the same theory that was propounded by the United States
17. See note 7 supra.
18. See note 14 supra.
19. See Turner v. Commonwealth, 358 Pa. 350, 365, 58 A. 2d 61, 65 (1948), and the
cases cited in Appendix B.
20. For a unique dictum stating the consideration to be given an illegal detention, per
se, as a factor to exclude a confession, see Commonwealth v. Mayhew, 297 Ky.
172, 178 S.W. 2d 928, 932 (1943).
21. See Appendix B.
22. Walker v. State,__ Okl._, 205 P.2d 335 (1949); Williams v. State,__ Ok.__ 205
P. 2d 524 (1949).
23. Moore v. State,__Miss._, 41 So. 2d 368 (1949); certiorari denied 338 U.S. 844
(1949).
24. Commonwealth v. Mercier, 257 Mass. 353, 153 N.E. 834 (1926).
25. The dissenting-concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 57 (1949), exemplifies this theory.
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Supreme Court in Wolf v. Colorado, 26 a case involving the admissibility
of illegally seized evidence. Condemning the "time-honored method - de-
tention without arraignment - for keeping the accused under exclusive
control of the police," 27 the advocates of this theory admit into evi-
dence the confession that is taken during the illegal period, saying that
the procedural rule which requires an immediate arraignment does not
govern the court on evidentiary matters. These rules are said to be di-
rectives to the law-enforcing officers; should they be violated, the officers
should be punished according to the statute, but the confession, unless it
can be shown to have been forced, will be admitted. 28
Whatever may be said for the theories advanced to justify the states'
action, one principle is clear and almost consistently followed by every
state: illegal detention, per se, will not serve as a basis for excluding a
confession. This principle is the state rule.
Review of State Decisions by the Supreme Court 29
Although state courts have been reversed on their decisions on the ad-
missibility of confessions, they have not been reversed in their basic con-
tention that the confessions taken during an illegal period are admissible,
unless they can be shown to have been coerced. No state has ever been
reversed solely on the grounds that it admitted a confession which was the
fruit of an irregular procedure. Exercising that delicate power of review,
the Supreme Court of the United States seems always to find one or more
factors which the states have overlooked and which provide a basis for
using the exclusionary rule. 30 Except in federal cases, however, the
Court has never reversed a conviction because it was based on a con-
fession that was obtained during a period of illegal detention. 31 The
"civilized standards" of the McNabb case are reserved for the federal
cases. Perhaps the rationale of the McNabb case and the cases following
the rule in that case make its application to state-confession cases im-
26. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
27. Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting, Watts v. Indiana, supra, at 57.
28. The purpose of these prompt arraignment statutes is set forth in an historical
note in McKinney's New York Code Crim. Pro., sec. 187. Briefly stated, the
purpose is the vitiation of the conditions under which "third-degree", "cold-
storage", and other coercive police practices thrive. That this purpose cannot
be achieved by the use of alternative devices, see Mr. Justice Murphy's trench-
ant dissent in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949). See also "Defense in
Criminal Cases Prior to Trial", an address delivered by Lemuel B. Schofield,
Esq., before the Philadelphia Bar Association, December, 1939. [Published in
pamphlet form by the Phila. Bar Assn.; cited also in brief for Petitioner, p. 45,
Turner v. Commonwealth, 338 U.S. 62 (1949)].
29. See Appendix C. All cases cited involve a question of due process, and coercion
of some form was decisive in each case.
30. ibid.
31. Perez v. People, 300 N.Y. 208, 90 N.E. 2d 40 (1949); certiorari denied 338 U.S.
952, S. 70 Ct. 483 (1950); rehearing denied 338 U.S. , 70 S. Ct. 483 (1950). In
refusing to hear this case the Supreme Court avoided the possibility of having to
determine whether or not an illegal detention of itself would invalidate a con-
fession.
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possible. If this is so, a new rule - a civilized rule - must be established
for the regulation of non-federal confession cases.
A Civilized Rule for States
Since Mr. Justice Cardozo's statement that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment included all those basic notions which are im-
plicit in ordered liberty, 32 the scope of that Clause has been broadened
more and more "by a gradual and empiric process of 'inclusion and ex-
clusion'." 33 As our free society advanced, the standards of what is
deemed reasonable and right have advanced; for this reason it has become
impossible to determine once and for all the limits or essentials of funda-
mental rights. 34 Just as our failure to see a traffic signal does not re-
fute the existence of the signal, neither does our failure to recognize a
fundamental right imply its nonexistence.
Without hiding behind some technicality which a law might produce in
these confession cases, one conclusion cannot be refuted: the basic issue
involved is one of due process. Simply stated, this means that no person
shall be deprived of life or property, unless this deprivation be accom-
plished by the means prescribed by law. Such has been the basis of Anglo-
American criminal justice since that famous meeting at Runnymede in
1215, and since that day no English or American court has declared the
rule to be otherwise. Although the concept has a changing content and the
content has been changed, the notion that a person shall not forfeit life or
property without due process of law has never been erased from the sys-
tem. An examination of the system discloses what is essential for the
achievement of due process and shows that the requirement of a prompt
hearing before a magistrate is one of those fundamental principles of lib-
erty and justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institu-
tions. 35 The pervasiveness of the statutory requirements of a prompt
hearing before a magistrate, 36 a recognition of its traditionally im-
portant place inthe common law, 37 the inclusion of it in An International
Bill of Rights, 8 and the intimations of the United States Supreme Court
in Watts v. Indiana 39 certainly give strong support to the belief that the
32. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
33. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
34. ibid.
35. This notion was suggested, but not too strenuously, in the Brief for Petitioner,
p. 21, Turner v. Commonwealth, 338 U.S. 62 (1949).
36. See note 7, supra, and Appendix A.
37. Wright v. Court and Others, 4 B&C 596, 107 Eng. Rep. 1182 (1825); See also 4
Blackstone, Commentaries, p. (*) 296, 8 R.C.L. 104.
38. Department of State Publication, No. 3055, p. 4; 18 Department of State Bulletin
200 (Feb. 15, 1948).
39. "Ours is the accusatorial system as opposed to the inquisatorial system. Such
has been characteristic of Anglo-American criminal justice since it freed itself
from practices borrowed by the Star Chamber from the continent whereby an ac-
cused person was interrogated in secret for hours on end... The requirement of
specific charges, their proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the protection of the ac-
cused from confessipn extorted through whatever form of police practices,the
right to a prompt hearing before a magistrate.. .these are all characteristics of the
accusatorial system and manifestations of its demands." Watts v. Indiana, supra
at 54. (emphasis added).
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preliminary hearing is necessary for the existence and continuance of the
"accusatorial system" 40 and is one of those precepts which are implicit
in our system of ordered liberty. Considering the support given to this
contention by such impressive authority, the requirement of a prompt
hearing before a magistrate should be declared 41 to be one of those ele-
ments which are indispensable to the maintenance of our system of crim-
inal justice and which are made operative against the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A court that does
this, however, has solved only half of the problem; it must take the second
step and employ the exclusionary rule which has been used in the federal
cases and which is said to be indicative of "civilized standards." 42
To declare the illegal detention a violation of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and then to admit into evidence the confes-
sion elicited during such a period is to give tacit sanction to the lawless-
ness of the law-enforcing body and to reduce the Fourteenth Amendment
"to a mere form of words". 43 To reject the confession - and this is the
only satisfactory approach-is to give vitality to the Due Process Clause as
against the states and to preserve its "historic function of assuring ap-
propriate procedure before liberty is curtailed and life taken." 44
Otis M. Smith
Charles V. Stoelker, Jr.
Jerome I. Walsh
APPENDIX A: ARRAIGNMENT STATUTES
Alabama: Code 1940, Title 15, Sec. 160; Alaska: Compiled Laws, 1946,
Chap. 66, Sec. 5-33, 66, Sec. 5-34; Arizona: Code 1939, Title 44, Sec. 107;
Arkansas: Statutes 1947, Title 43, Sec. 601; California: Penal Code 1949,
Sec. 825; Colorado: Statutes 1935, Chap. 48, Sec. 428; Connecticut: Gen-
eral Statutes, 1949, Sec. 465; Delaware: Rev. Code 1935, Chap. 119, Sec.
11, 4456, 149, Sec. 17, 5173; District of Columbia: Code 1940, Title 4-
140, 23-301; Florida: Statutes 1943, Title 45, Sec. 901.6; Georgia: Code
1933, Chap. 27, Sec. 210, Sec. 212; Hawaii: Rev. Laws, 1945, Chap. 230,
Sec. 10709; Idaho: Code 1949, Sec. 19-515, 19-518, 19-614, 19-615; Illi-
nois: Smith-Hurd, Chap. 38, Sec. 655, 660; Indiana: Burns Stat. Chap. 7,
Sec. 9-704; Iowa: Code 1946, Chap. 755.14, 757.2; Kansas: Gen. Statutes,
1935, Sec. 62-610; Kentucky: Code 1938, Sec. 45, 46; Louisiana: Rev.
Statutes 1950, Sec. 15-79, 15-80, 15-84.2; Maine: Rev. Statutes 1944, C.
134, Sec. 9; Massachusetts: Gen. Laws 1932, C. 276, Sec. 22, Sec. 29,
Sec. 34; Michigan: Comp. Laws 1948, Sec. 764.13, 764.14; Minnesota:
Mason's Stat. 1927, C. 104, Sec. 10575, Sec. 10581; Mississippi: Code
1942, Title 11, Ch. 2, Sec. 2473; Missouri: Rev. Statutes 1939, Ch. 30,
40. Watts v. Indiana, see note 39 supra.
41. This is not to say that rights are created by the court;rather it is meant that rights
already existent are judicially recognized and declared.
42. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
43. Holmes, J., cited in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy, Wolf v. Colorado,
supra at 42.
44. Watts v. Indiana, supra at 55.
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Art. 5, Sec. 3862, Sec. 3883; Montana: Rev. Code 1947, Sec. 94-5804, 94-
5907, 94-5908; Nebraska: Rev. Statutes 1943, Sec. 29-412; Nevada: Comp.
Stat. 1929, Secs. 10744-10748, 10762-10764; New Hampshire: Rev. Laws
1942, Ch. 423, Sec. 3, 4, 6; New Jersey: Rev. Stat. 1937, 2:216-219; New
York: Code Crim. Proc. 1939, Sec. 158-159, 165, 185; North Carolina:
Code 1943, Secs. 15-24, 15-46; North Dakota: Rev. Code 1943, Secs. 29-
0511, 29-0520,29-0623-29-0625; Ohio: Crim. Code 1945,13432-3, 13432-4;
Oklahoma: Stat. 1941, Title 22, Sec. 176-177, 181, 205; Oregon: Code
1940, Secs. 26-1538, 26-1547; Pennsylvania: Purdon's Perm. Ed. Tit. 19,
Sec. 3, 4; Rhode Island: Gen. Laws 1938: C. 625, Sec. 68; South Carolina:
Code 1942, Secs. 907, 920; South Dakota: Code 1939, Secs. 34.1608, 34.
1919-34.1624; Tennessee: Michie's Code 1938, Secs. 11515, 11544; Texas:
Verman's Texas Stat. 1948, Title 5, Sec. 217; Utah: Code 1943, Secs. 105-
4-4, 105-12-14, 103-26-51; Virginia: Code 1950, Title 19-77; Washington:
Remington's Rev. Stat. 1932, Title 13, C. 4, Sec. 1949, C. 1, Sec. 1926;
West Virginia: Code 1949, Sec. 6150; Wisconsin: Stat. 1947, Sec. 361.08;
Wyoming: Comp. Stats. 1945, Chap. 10- 306, 10-307, 10-310.
APPENDIX B: CASES CONSTRUING ARRAIGNMENT STATUTES
Alabama: Ingram v. State, Ala. , 42 So. 2d 30 (1949): Ingram v.
State, Ala._, 42 So. 2d 36 (1949); Arkansas: Palmer v. State, 213 Ark.
956, 214 S. W. 2d 372 (1948) certiorari denied 336 U.S. 921 (1949); Cal-
ifornia: People v. Nagle, 25 Cal. 2d 216, 153 P. 2d 344 (1944); Connecti-
cut: State v. Buteau, 136 Conn. 113, 68 A. 2d 681 (1949) certiorari denied
338 U.S. , 18 L. W. 3239, Feb. 20, 1950; Florida: Finley v. State, 153
Fla. 394, 14 So. 2d 844 (1943); Idaho: State v. Behlar, 65 Ida. 464, 146 P.
2d 338 (1944); Illinois: People v. McFarland, 386 Ill. 122, 53 N. E. 2d
884 (1944); Indiana: Hicks v. State, 213 Ind. 277, 11 N. E. 2d 171 (1937)
certiorari denied Hicks v. State, 304 U.S. 564 (1937); Kansas: State v.
Smith, 158 Kan. 645, 149 P. 2d 600 (1944); Kentucky: Commonwealth v.
Mayhew, 297 Ky. 172, 178 S. W. 2d 928 (1944); Maryland: Grear v. State,
Md. , 71 A. 2d 24 (1950); Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Di
Stasio, 294 Mass. 273, 1 N. E. 2d 189 (1936), Commonwealth v. Di Stasio,
297 Mass. 347, 8 N. E. 2d 923 (1937) certiorari denied 302 U.S. 683 (1937).
certiorari denied 312 U.S. 759 (1937); Mississippi: Moore v. State,
Miss.-, 41 So. 2d 368 (1949) certiorari denied 338 U.S. 844 (1949); Mis-
souri: State v. Ellis, 354 Mo. 998, 193 S. W. 2d 31 (1946): State v. Sand-
ford, 354 Mo. 1012, 193 S. W. 2d 35 (1946) certiorari denied 328 U.S. 873
(1946); New Jersey: State v. Klausner, 4 N. J. S. 436, 67 A. 2d 468 (1949);
New York: People v. Perez, 300 N. Y. 208, 90 N. E. 2d 40 (1949) certi-
orari denied Feb. 6, 1950, 18 L. W. 3227, rehearing denied March 13,
1950, 18 L. W. 3257; North Dakota: State v. Nagel, 75 N. D. 495, 28 N. W.
2d 665 (1947); Ohio: State v. Collett, 58 N. E. 2d 417 (1944) appeal dis-
missed 144 Ohio St. 639, 60 N. E. 2d 170 (1945); Oklahoma: Walker v.
State, Okla. Cr. , 205 P. 2d 335 (1949): Williams v. State, Okl.
Cr. ,205 P. 2d 524(1949); Oregon: State v. Folkes, 174 Ore. 568, 150
p. 2d 17 (1944) certiorari denied 323 U.S. 779 (1944); South Carolina:
State v. Brown, 212 S. C. 237, 47 S. E. 2d 521 (1948) certiorari denied
335 U.S. 834 (1948).
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APPENDIX C: AN ANALYSIS OF FACTORS CONSIDERED BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME















































36 hrs of battery-
type interrogation.
Two confessions ob-
tained; one by coer-
cion; the other was
given freely. Only
the second was used.
Conflict on vio-
lence; D taken from






















race, this factor did




D kept in the "hole" Mature person
for seven days; con-
fession resulted.
Conflict on violence: Mature person
D held five days in-
communicado; third
degree.
Three day delay; in- Unschooled person
termittent question-
ing; one twelve hour
period.
* In almost every case listed above there was a failure by the police to advise the accused's rela-
tives that he was being detained. Further, the accused was usually deprived of counsel. The




By reversing this convic-
tion, the S/C gave addi-
tional protection to the
accused under the 14th
Amendment.
Conviction reversed; Su-
preme Court showed that
it would make a determi-
nation of fact - the volun-




S/C was still looking to
the voluntary or involun-
tary nature of the confes-
sion.
Conviction reversed;
moving D from place to
place was said to be coer-
cion. Court also consid-
ered the persistent ques-
tioning.
Conviction was reversed
on the grounds that psycho-
logical force was applied
and that such force would
vitiate the confession.
Conviction sustained, be-
cause the second confes-
sion was not coerced.
Conviction reversed; based
partly on the coercion. No
advance made in this case.
Conviction reversed; the
D's age seemed to be the
most important factor.
Shortest period of delay
yet considered.
S/C reversed conviction on
the grounds that this kind
of treatment was physical
torture.
Conviction reversed; de-
lay and treatment said to
violated due process.
Conviction reversed.
